High frequency trading (Machine learning, Neural networks),
Algorithmic trading

Machine learning for high frequency trading and market microstructure data and problems.

Machine learning is a vibrant subfield of computer science that draws on models and methods from statistics, algorithms, computational complexity, artificial intelligence, control theory, and a variety of other disciplines. Its primary focus is on computationally and informationally efficient algorithms for inferring good predictive models from large data sets.

The special challenges for machine learning presented by HFT generally arise from the very fine granularity of the data — often microstructure data at the resolution of individual orders, (partial) executions, hidden liquidity, and cancellations —

• understanding of how such low-level data relates to actionable circumstances (such as profitably buying or selling shares, optimally executing a large order, etc,
• how the distribution of liquidity in the order book relates to future price movements,
• feature selection or feature engineering
- are the important process in machine learning for HFT
High Frequency Data for Machine Learning

High frequency trading - holding periods, order types (e.g. passive versus aggressive), and strategies (momentum or reversion, directional or liquidity provision, etc.).

Data driving HFT activity tends to be the most granular available. Typically microstructure data - every order placed, every execution, and every cancellation, and reconstruction (at least for equities) of the full limit order book.

A single day’s worth of microstructure data on a highly liquid stock is measured in gigabytes. Storing this data historically for any meaningful period and number of names requires both compression and significant disk usage; processing this data efficiently generally requires streaming through the data by only uncompressing small amounts at a time.

What systematic signal or information is contained in microstructure data? - What “features” or variables can we extract from this extremely granular, lower-level data.
Limit Order Trading and Market Simulation

Limit order markets: By this we mean that buyers and sellers specify not only their desired volumes, but their desired prices as well. A limit order to buy (respectively, sell) \( V \) shares at price \( p \) may partially or completely execute at prices at or below \( p \) (at or above \( p \)).

For example, suppose that NVIDIA Corp. (NVDA) is currently trading at roughly \$27.22\ a share (see Figure 1, which shows an actual snapshot of an NVDA order book), but we are only willing to buy 1000 shares at \$27.13\ a share or lower. We can choose to submit a limit order with this specification, and our order will be placed in the buy order book, which is ordered by price, with the highest price at the top (this price is referred to as the bid; the lowest sell price is called the ask). In the example provided, our order would be placed immediately after the extant order for 109 shares at \$27.13\; though we offer the same price, this order has arrived before ours. If an arriving limit order can be immediately executed with orders on the opposing book, the executions occur. For example, a limit order to buy 2500 shares at \$27.27\ will cause execution with the limit sell orders for 713 shares at \$27.22\, and the 1000-share and 640-share sell orders at \$27.27\, for a total of 2353 shares executed. The remaining (unexecuted) 147 shares of the arriving buy order will become the new bid at \$27.27\. It is important to note that the prices of executions are the prices specified in the limit orders already in the books, not the prices of the incoming order that is immediately executed. Thus we receive successively worse prices as we consume orders deeper in the opposing book.
Performance and policies found by RL vary with stock properties such as liquidity, volume traded, and volatility

Submit and leave (S&L) policies

State-based strategies – strategies that can examine salient features of the current order books and our own activity – in order to decide what to do next.

Variables: elapsed time $t$, remaining inventory $i$, which represent how much time of the horizon $H$ has passed and how many shares we have left to execute in the target volume $V$. Different resolutions of accuracy will be investigated for these variables, which we refer to as private variables, since they are essentially only known and of primary concern to our execution strategy. More precisely, we pick $I$ and $T$, which are the

**Figure 1.** Snapshot of NVDA order book.
resolutions (maximum values) of the private variables $i$ and $t$, respectively. $I$ represents the number of inventory units our policy can distinguish between – if $V = 10,000$ shares, and $I = 4$, our remaining inventory is represented in rounded units of $V/I = 2,500$ shares each. Similarly, we divide the time horizon $H$ into $T$ distinct points at which the policy is allowed to observe the state and take an action; for $H = 2$ min and $T = 4$ we can submit a revised limit order every 30 seconds, and the time remaining variable $t$ can assume values from 0 (start of the episode) down to 4 (last decision point of the episode).

Additional state variables: market variables, a state has the form $x_m = <t, i, o_1, ..., o_R>$, where the $o_j$ are market variables.

Action space: simple limit order price at which to reposition all of our remaining inventory, for the problem of selling $V$ shares, action $a$ corresponds to placing a limit order for all of our unexecuted shares at price $ask - a$. Thus we are effectively withdrawing any previous outstanding limit order we may have (which is indeed supported by the actual exchanges), and replacing with a new limit order. Thus $a$ may be positive or negative, with $a = 0$ corresponding to coming in at the current ask, positive $a$ corresponding to "crossing the spread" towards the buyers, and negative $a$ corresponding to placing our order in the sell book.

Rewards: An action from a given state may produce immediate rewards, which are essentially the proceeds (cash inflows or outflows, depending on whether we are selling or buying) from any (partial) execution of the limit order placed. Furthermore, since we view the execution of all $V$
shares as mandatory, any inventory remaining at the end of time His immediately executed at market prices --- that is, we eat into the opposing book to execute, no matter how poor the prices, since we have run out of time and have no choice.

Measure the execution prices achieved by a policy relative to the mid-spread price \((\text{ask}+\text{bid})/2\) at the start of the episode in question. Thus, we are effectively comparing performance to the idealized policy which can execute all \(V\) of its shares immediately at the mid-spread, and thus are assuming infinite liquidity at that point.

Trading cost of a policy: the underperformance compared to the midspread baseline.

We assume that commissions and exchange fees are negligible.
Predicting Price Movement from Order Book State

Learn models that themselves profitably decide when to trade and how to trade:

- The development of features that permit the reliable prediction of directional price movements from certain states. By “reliable” we do not mean high accuracy, but just enough that our profitable trades outweigh our unprofitable ones.
- The development of learning algorithms for execution that capture this predictability or alpha at sufficiently low trading costs.

First find profitable predictive signals:

- Bid-Ask Spread:
- Price: A feature measuring the recent directional movement of executed prices.
- Smart Price: A variation on mid-price where the average of the bid and ask prices is weighted according to their inverse volume.
- Trade Sign: A feature measuring whether buyers or sellers crossed the spread more frequently in recent executions.
- Bid-Ask Volume Imbalance:
- Signed Transaction Volume:

Features above were normalized. In order to obtain a finite state space, features were discretized into bins in multiples of standard deviation units.
Learning algorithm: buying 1 share at the bid-ask midpoint and holding the position for t seconds, at which point we sell the position, again at the midpoint; and the opposite action, where we sell at the midpoint and buy t seconds later. In the first set of experiments we describe, we considered a short period of t = 10 seconds.

The methodology can now be summarized as follows:

For each of 19 names, order book reconstruction on historical data was performed.

At each trading opportunity, the current state (the value of the six microstructure features described above) was computed, and the profit or loss of both actions (buy then sell, sell then buy) is tabulated via order book simulation to compute the midpoint movement.

Learning was performed for each name using all of 2008 as the training data. For each state $\mathbf{x}$ in the state space, the cumulative payoff for both actions across all visits to $\mathbf{x}$ in the training period was computed.

Learning then resulted in a policy $\pi$ mapping states to action, where $\pi(\mathbf{x})$ is defined to be whichever action yielded the greatest training set profitability in state $\mathbf{x}$.

Testing of the learned policy for each each name was performed using all 2009 data. For each test set visit to state $\mathbf{x}$, we take the action $\pi(\mathbf{x})$ prescribed by the learned policy, and compute the overall 2009 profitability of this policy.
FIGURE 4: Correlations between feature values and learned policies. For each of the six features and 19 policies, we project the policy onto just the single feature compute the correlation between the feature value and action learned (+1 for buying, -1 for selling). Features indices are in the order Bid-Ask Spread, Price, Smart Price, Trade Sign, Bid-Ask Volume Imbalance, Signed Transaction Volume.
FIGURE 5: Comparison of test set profitability across 19 names for learning with all six features (red bars, identical in each subplot) versus learning with only a single feature (blue bars).
Optimal strategy found:

- momentum behaviour for time periods of milliseconds to seconds,
- reversion strategies for dozens of seconds to several minutes

Aspects that one must consider when applying machine learning to high frequency data: the nature of the underlying price formation process, and the role and limitations of the learning algorithm itself.
Empirical Limitations on High Frequency Trading Profitability

Empirical study estimating the maximum possible profitability of the most aggressive such practices: trading strategy exclusively employing market orders and relatively short holding periods.

The overarching fear is that quantitative trading groups, armed with advanced networking and computing technology and expertise, are in some way victimizing retail traders and other less sophisticated parties. The HFT debate often conflates distinct phenomena, confusing, for instance, dark pools and flash trading, which are essentially new market mechanisms, with HFT itself, which is a type of trading behaviour applicable to both existing and emerging exchanges. The core concern regarding HFT, however, is relatively straightforward: that the ability to electronically execute trades on extraordinarily short time scales, combined with the quantitative modelling of massive stores of historical data, permits a variety of practices unavailable to most parties. A broad example would be the discovery of very short-term informational advantages (for instance, by detecting large, slow trades in the market) and profiting from them by trading rapidly and aggressively.

We demonstrate an upper bound of $21 billion for the entire universe of U.S. equities in 2008 at the longest holding periods, down to $21 million or less for the shortest holding periods (see discussion of holding periods below). Furthermore, we believe these numbers to be vast overestimates of the profits that could actually be achieved in the real world. These figures should be contrasted with the approximately $50 trillion annual
trading volume in the same markets. We believe our findings are of interest in their own right as well as potentially relevant to the ongoing debate over HFT.

Tension between two basic quantities: the horizon or holding period, as measured by the length of time for which a (long or short) position in a stock is held; and the costs of trading, as measured by (at least) the bid-ask spread that must be crossed by market orders.

We compute the profit or loss of the HF trader in *hindsight*, and reach empirical overestimates of profitability.

Data: A small set of the most liquid (and therefore most profitable) stocks on NASDAQ, and then use a slightly less detailed data set and regression methods to scale up our estimates to a much larger universe of all US stocks, and across all exchanges.

**Related literature:** Aldridge examines foreign exchange trading. Chaboud et al. study foreign exchange markets: HFT does not cause an increase in volatility. Hendershott et al. analyze trading of US equities, and find that HFT improves liquidity. The same authors examine German markets.
Constraints on HFT: aggressive order placement and short holding periods. We propose that aggressive orders are the greatest cause for any concerns about the negative impacts on trading counterparties; passive order placement can only improve the market both in prices and volumes.

If one of the advantages of (and concerns over) HFT is the ability to very rapidly take and liquidate positions to profit from short-term informational advantages, aggressive order placement is necessary.

For these reasons we shall restrict our attention to aggressive order placement.

We shall consider holding periods as short as 10 milliseconds and as long as 10 seconds.

Two different sources of raw trading data: order book data and Trade and Quote, or TAQ, data on a much larger set of stocks and exchanges.

In this framework, we simulate the profitability of the following OT, whose only parameter is the holding period $h$:

- At each time $t$, the OT may either buy or sell $v$ shares, for every integer $v \geq 0$. The purchase or sale of the $v$ shares occurs at market prices; thus according to the standard U.S. equities limit order mechanism, the OT crosses the spread and consumes the first $v$ shares on the opposing order book, receiving possibly progressively worse prices for successive shares.
• If at time $t$ the OT bought/sold $v$ shares, at time $t + h$ it must liquidate this position and sell/buy the shares back, again by crossing the spread and paying market prices on the opposing book. (We later discuss the effects of allowing a variable holding period.)

• At each time $t$, the OT makes only that trade (buying or selling, and the choice of $v$) that optimizes profitability. Obviously it is this aspect of the OT that requires knowledge of the future. Note that if no trade at $t$ has positive profitability, the OT does nothing.

Details:

1. If $h \downarrow 0$ then $v = 0$ for most of $t$. This design for the OT accurately captures the fundamental tension of (aggressive) HFT. If we denote the bid-ask spread at time $t$ by $s_t$, it is clear that the purchase or sale of even a single share by the OT will incur transaction costs on the order of at least $\frac{1}{2} (s_t + s_{t+h})$ — the mean of the spreads at the onset and liquidation of the position. Larger values for $v$ will increase these costs, since eating further into the opposing books effectively widens the spreads. Thus, in order for a trade of $v$ shares to be profitable, the share price must have time to change enough to cover the spread-based transaction costs. (Since we omnisciently optimize between buying and selling, as well as the trade
volume, sufficient movement either up or down will result in some profitable trade.) Of course, the smaller the holding period h, the less frequently such fluctuations will occur — indeed, we find that for sufficiently small h, the vast majority of the time the optimal choice is $v = 0$ — that is, no trade is made by the OT.

2. Large data $\implies$ high computation time.

3. We assume the trades of the OT have no impact on the market.

4. We assume no trading fees or commissions are paid by the HFT.

5. We assume that offers taken by the trader remain on the books, allowing the trader to repeatedly profit from a single opportunity as often as 100 times per second.

6. No mixing: We do not allow the OT to enter a position with a market order but exit with a limit order (or vice versa).

7. No forward looking strategy

8. We allow trading every 10 milliseconds conditioned on there being any change.

9. This also replicates the actual HFT during this period.
Omniscient Order Book Trading: Even at the longest holding period of 10 seconds the total 2008 OT profits are only $3.4 billion, down to just $62,000 for the shortest (10ms) holding period.

Figure 2: OT profits and other quantities vs. holding period for the 19 NASDAQ stocks on the order book data.
**Market-Wide Extrapolation**

Extrapolate our results to all stocks and all exchanges by utilizing the broader but somewhat less detailed Trade and Quote (TAQ). We estimate a primary-to-composite conversion ratio (in a given name, around 50% of profits come from the primary exchange.

The earlier target 19 stocks traded primarily on NASDAQ, are also traded on a variety of alternative exchanges that in some instances may offer better pricing. TAQ data are limited in do not record liquidity offered beyond the current bid and ask prices.

![Figure 5: Modified vs original OT profit estimates](image)

![Figure 6: Composite vs. primary exchange profits](image)
At each time $t$, the OT can buy or sell $v$ shares, where $v \geq 0$ is an integer bounded by the number of shares available to buy (sell) at the ask (bid) at time $t$ as well as the number of shares available to sell (buy) at the bid (ask) at time $t + h$. For example, if 100 shares are offered at the ask price at time $t$ and 50 shares are offered at the bid price at time $t + h$, then the OT can only consider buying up to 50 shares at time $t$. (Since the trader is omniscient, it can compute these limits even though they depend on future information.) As before, any position taken at time $t$ must be liquidated at time $t + h$.

The modified OT (simulated on TAQ data) occasionally achieves higher profits than the original OT. Correlation is 0.969. We assume that the original OT’s profits are closely estimated as a multiple of the modified OT’s profits. So we directly apply extrapolation ratios.
Extrapolation scheme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other exchanges</th>
<th>TAQ modified OT (1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NASDAQ</td>
<td>Order book OT</td>
<td>Profit vs. Quote regression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 stocks</td>
<td>All of Ω</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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**Step (1):** On average, profits increase by a factor of 2.1. Finally, we estimated composite profits of the original OT by multiplying the profits reported in Section 6 by the corresponding ratios depicted in Figure 6.

**Step (2) Regression:** Figure 7 shows the fit between profits and the number of TAQ quotes achieved by a simple two-parameter power law model for the same 19 stocks. The $R^2$ value is 0.968. Using this regression, we can quickly estimate potential profits for a full universe of 6,279 US stocks, yielding a bound on the total HFT profits available in all of 2008 at 10 second holding: $21.3$ billion.
Machine learning approach offers no easy paths to profitability: Even if all the features we enumerate here are true predictors of future returns, and even if all of them line up just right for maximum profit margins, one still cannot justify trading aggressively and paying the bid-ask spread, since the magnitude of predictability is not sufficient to cover transaction costs.

Figure 7: Composite profit upper bounds (10 second holding) vs number of quotes
References:


