

# Empirical Limitations on High Frequency Trading Profitability

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## Abstract

Addressing the ongoing examination of high-frequency trading practices in financial markets, we report the results of an extensive **empirical study estimating the maximum possible profitability** of the most aggressive such practices, and arrive at figures that are surprisingly modest. By “aggressive” we mean any trading strategy exclusively employing market orders and relatively short holding periods. Our findings highlight the tension between execution costs and trading horizon confronted by high-frequency traders, and provide a controlled and large-scale empirical perspective on the high-frequency debate that has heretofore been absent. Our study employs a number of novel empirical methods, including the simulation of an “omniscient” high-frequency trader who can see the future and act accordingly.

## 1 Introduction

The recent financial crisis has been accompanied by rising popular, media, and regulatory alarm over what is broadly called high frequency trading (HFT in the sequel). The overarching fear is that quantitative trading groups, armed with advanced networking and computing technology and expertise, are in some way victimizing retail traders and other less sophisticated parties. The HFT debate often conflates distinct phenomena, confusing, for instance, dark pools and flash trading, which are essentially new market mechanisms, with HFT itself, which is a type of trading behavior applicable to both existing and emerging exchanges. The core concern regarding HFT, however, is relatively straightforward: that the ability to electronically execute trades on extraordinarily short time scales,<sup>1</sup> combined with the quantitative modeling of massive stores of historical data, permits a variety of practices unavailable to most parties. A broad example would be the discovery of very short-term informational advantages (for instance, by detecting large, slow trades in the market) and profiting from them by trading rapidly and aggressively.

Despite the growing controversy over HFT,<sup>2</sup> there appear to be no objective, large-scale empirical studies of the potential profitability and impact of HFT. The purpose of this paper is to provide one such study. Our main conclusion is perhaps unexpected: for at least one broad class of “aggressive” HFT, the total available market size — that is, the maximum profit that could conceivably be realized using this type of HFT — is rather modest (relative to the size of the market and the publicly-reported trading revenues of other market participants). More precisely, we demonstrate an upper bound of \$21 billion for the *entire universe of U.S. equities in 2008* at the longest holding periods, down to \$21 million or less for the shortest holding periods (see discussion of holding periods below). Furthermore, we believe these numbers to be vast overestimates of the profits that could actually be achieved in the real world. These figures should be contrasted with the approximately \$50 *trillion* annual trading volume in the same markets. We believe our findings are of interest in their own right as well as potentially relevant to the ongoing debate over HFT.

In our study, we make a crucial distinction between *passive* HFT, in which a HFT strategy exclusively places limit orders that are not immediately marketable — and thus acts as a provider of liquidity to the market — and *aggressive* HFT, in which only market orders are used, and thus the HFT must pay the attendant execution costs of crossing the bid-ask spread. In this study we focus *only on aggressive HFT*,

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<sup>1</sup>Often measured in milliseconds or less, and aided by colocation, the placement of trading servers directly at the exchange.

<sup>2</sup>As of this writing, SEC and congressional investigations into HFT practices were ongoing.

and we shall argue that this is the variety of HFT that should be the primary focus of any concern, since the presence of passive HFT can only provide price and liquidity improvement to any trading counterparties.<sup>3</sup>

For aggressive HFT, there is a fundamental tension between two basic quantities: the *horizon* or *holding period*, as measured by the length of time for which a (long or short) position in a stock is held; and the *costs* of trading, as measured by (at least) the bid-ask spread that must be crossed by market orders on entry and liquidation of the position. In order for a trade to be profitable, the position must be held long enough for favorable price movement sufficient to overcome the trading costs. The shorter the holding period, the more extreme (and thus less frequent) the relative price movements must be for profitability. As we shall argue, rational concern over HFT should focus on short holding periods — measured in seconds or less — since at longer holding periods, the advantages of rapid exchange access and low latency are obviously diminished compared to the general trading population. While this tension between horizon and costs is well-understood in quantitative finance, it has not before been empirically studied on a large scale in the context of HFT, which is our main contribution.

At the core of our experimental study is a novel but simple technique we call the *Omniscient Trader Methodology* (or OTM). Given the constraints of aggressive HFT, and armed with two large and rich historical trading data sets, we compute the profit or loss of all possible trades available to the HF trader *in hindsight*, and reach empirical overestimates of profitability by counting *only the profitable trades*. In this way we deliberately remove the greatest difficulty in real quantitative trading — that of predicting which trades will be profitable — and obtain what are certainly gross overestimates of the profits realizable in practice to a trader engaging in aggressive HFT. Of course, such a study is interesting only if these overestimates are still surprisingly modest, which is exactly the conclusion we shall establish.

The overview of our methodology is as follows. We begin with the highest-resolution data available: every message from the NASDAQ stock exchange, which permits exact replication of the full historical evolution of the order books for any chosen stock on that exchange. We use this data to simulate the aforementioned OTM; however, the sheer volume of messages and computational intensity of these experiments preclude running them on all of the thousands of stocks traded on NASDAQ. Furthermore, NASDAQ is only one of the exchanges on which US stocks are traded, so does not provide the full picture of potential profits. To remedy these shortcomings, we employ a two-step process: first we use the OTM to upper bound the profitability of HFT on a small set of the most liquid (and therefore most profitable) stocks on NASDAQ, and then use a slightly less detailed data set and regression methods to scale up our estimates to a much larger universe of all US stocks, and across all exchanges. At every step of this process we are careful to err on the side of overestimation in order to ensure that our final figures are upper bounds on total HFT profitability.

Our primary contributions can be summarized as follows:

- We provide the first controlled and objective empirical study of the profitability of (aggressive) HFT based on extensive historical market microstructure data, and discuss its implications.
- We develop new empirical methods for the estimation of the profitability of various classes of trading strategies, including the Omniscient Trader Methodology, and techniques for extrapolating profitability from a smaller to a larger set of stocks and exchanges.
- We report detailed findings relating a variety of fundamental market microstructure variables, including price movement, spreads, trading volume and profitability.

## 2 Related Work

A significant motivation for our work has been the recent attention paid to HFT in the mainstream and online media. Some major news outlets and industry experts have expressed concern over the rising popularity of HFT and its influence on the price formation process [5, 14, 12, 7], while others have concluded that HFT is unobjectionable or even beneficial [13, 8, 15]. The debate centers on a basic difference in perspective: Does HFT allow large firms to make money by preying on other market participants with less sophisticated technology and slower access to exchanges? Or do high-frequency traders effectively compete amongst themselves

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<sup>3</sup>In practice, HFT strategies may employ mixtures of limit and market orders. We expect to extend our methodology to passive HFT shortly.

to provide the service of enhanced liquidity to everyone else? Evidence presented by both sides tends to be largely anecdotal, in part because of the opaque nature of financial firms, particularly those practicing HFT. Academic research in this area is also limited, probably for similar reasons.

Nonetheless, there has been at least one attempt to study HFT empirically. Aldridge [1] applies an omniscient methodology related to ours, but examines foreign exchange trading. She reports per-period returns of 0.04% - 0.06% at short trading intervals (which are comparable to the returns found in our experiments), but is silent on total *profits*, which is our focus. Furthermore, her analysis centers around the Sharpe ratio, a measure of return per unit of risk. She shows that the simulated Sharpe ratio can rise above 5,000 at 10 second trading intervals, and in turn labels HFT strategies as extremely safe, but it is unclear what these numbers mean given that her simulation assumes an omniscient trader who by definition is never at risk of losing money. Sharpe ratios can obviously be driven arbitrarily high if we have perfect knowledge; here we demonstrate that profits cannot.

Other studies have focused on the qualitative effects of HFT. Chaboud et al. [3] study foreign exchange markets, and find that HFT does not cause an increase in volatility. Furthermore, they show that computerized HF traders provide liquidity more often than human traders following information shocks. Hendershott et al. analyze electronic trading of US equities [10], and find that HFT improves liquidity on NYSE in large-cap stocks. The same authors examine German markets in [9], where they conclude that HFT provides liquidity when it is expensive and takes it when it is cheap.

Others have tried to estimate the total (actual) profits due to HFT. Tabb et al. arrive at a number of \$21 billion or more [11], but a second report from the same group gives a figure of \$8.5 billion [16]. Donefer proposes \$15–25 billion in [4]. Schack and Gawronski of Rosenblatt Securities claim that all of these numbers are too high [15], but do not themselves offer a specific number. Goldman Sachs, considered by some to be a leader in HFT, claims in a note to clients that less than 1% of their revenues come from HFT [6], which bounds the annual HFT profits of Goldman Sachs at \$0.5 billion. All of these sources ostensibly account for both passive and aggressive HFT, but Arnuk and Saluzzi address aggressive HFT specifically and put it at \$1.5–3 billion per year [2].

In contrast to these studies, which are based largely on proprietary data and involve subjective estimates of realized profits, we propose a verifiable, empirical bound on the *maximum feasible* HFT profits using publicly available data. We also focus specifically on aggressive trading, which as we will discuss is the form of HFT with the greatest potential for harm.

### 3 Microstructure Preliminaries

We now provide some necessary background on the fundamental mechanism underlying the majority of modern electronic exchanges, including those of the U.S. equities markets.

The *open limit order book* is a market mechanism for implementing a type of continuous double auction. Suppose we wish to purchase 1000 shares of Microsoft (MSFT) stock on such an exchange. To do so, we submit a *limit order* that specifies not only the desired volume of 1000 shares, but also the maximum price we are willing to pay. Assuming that nobody is currently willing to sell at the price we have requested, our order gets placed in the *buy order book*, a list of all current offers to buy MSFT shares, sorted by price, with the highest price (known as the bid) at the top of the book. If there are multiple limit orders at the same price, they are ordered by time of arrival, with older orders getting priority. Symmetrically, the exchange maintains a sell order book containing offers to sell MSFT shares, sorted with the lowest price (known as the ask) at the top. Thus, the tops of the books always consist of the most competitive offers. The bid and ask prices together are referred to as the inside market, and the difference between them is known as the spread.

Figure 1 depicts an actual snapshot of an order book for MSFT<sup>4</sup>. The bid is \$24.062, and the ask is \$24.069. The spread is \$0.007. If we were to submit a buy order at \$24.04, our order would be placed immediately after the extant order for 5,503 shares at \$24.04.

If a buy (respectively, sell) limit order comes in above the ask (below the bid), a trade will occur. The incoming order will be matched with orders on the opposing book, beginning at the top, until either the incoming order's volume is filled or no further matching is possible. For example, suppose in Figure 1 a

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<sup>4</sup>Note that both the figure and accompanying numerical example are outdated in the sense that NASDAQ now enforces decimalization, but the mechanism is unchanged.

<a href="#">refresh</a>   <a href="#">island home</a>   <a href="#">disclaimer</a>   <a href="#">help</a>			
 <b>MSFT</b>		GET STOCK <input type="text" value="MSFT"/> <input type="button" value="go"/> <a href="#">Symbol Search</a>	
<b>LAST MATCH</b>		<b>TODAY'S ACTIVITY</b>	
Price 24.0700		Orders 52,983	
Time 14:57:07.72		Volume 10,243,212	
<b>BUY ORDERS</b>		<b>SELL ORDERS</b>	
SHARES	PRICE	SHARES	PRICE
500	24.0620	500	24.0690
6,000	24.0610	500	24.0690
5,000	24.0600	500	24.0700
100	24.0600	200	24.0800
1,100	24.0550	1,981	24.0900
100	24.0500	412	24.0900
5,000	24.0500	3,000	24.0980
200	24.0500	500	24.1000
3,294	24.0500	100	24.1200
1,000	24.0500	2,800	24.1400
3,000	24.0430	5,000	24.1400
100	24.0400	1,000	24.1400
5,503	24.0400	5,000	24.1500
2,100	24.0300	400	24.1600
2,800	24.0300	1,000	24.1700
(412 more)		(694 more)	

As of 14:57:16.178

Figure 1: Sample order books for MSFT.

buy order for 2000 shares arrives with a limit price of \$24.08. This order will be partially filled by the two 500-share sell orders at \$24.069, the 500-share order at \$24.07, and the 200-share order at \$24.08, for a total of 1700 shares executed. The remaining 300 shares of the incoming order would become the new top of the buy book; the new bid would be \$24.08 and the new ask would be \$24.09. Note that executions happen at the prices of the *resting limit orders*, not at the price of the incoming order. Thus, consuming orders deeper in the opposing book yields progressively worse prices for the party initiating execution.

Any order can be canceled at any time prior to execution. Full exchange rules are often more complicated, including hidden orders, trading halts, crosses, inter-exchange linkages, and other special mechanisms. Nonetheless, the vast majority of trading in modern markets takes place via the simple mechanism described above, and this is exactly the mechanism we replicate in our simulations.

## 4 Constraints on HFT

In order to empirically estimate the potential profitability of HFT in a meaningful way, we need to commit to a precise definition. Given our intention to apply omniscience in order to upper bound profitability, we need constraints that disallow arbitrarily large, long-term trades that could yield essentially unbounded profits in hindsight. The main constraints we shall impose are those of aggressive order placement and short holding periods.

### 4.1 Aggressive Order Placement

Traders in modern electronic exchanges have the choice between “passive” or “aggressive” order placement: they can either place limit orders that do not instigate any immediate executions and lie in their respective books awaiting possible later execution; or they can place immediately marketable orders that cross the spread, eat into the opposing book, and pay both the spread costs and potentially higher costs for “deeper” shares. With regards to the debate surrounding HFT, *we propose that aggressive orders are the greatest cause for any concerns about the negative impacts on trading counterparties*. The reason for this is both simple and well-understood in finance: passive order placement can only *improve* the market for any counterparties,

both in prices and volumes. By placing a passive limit order, a trader can only reduce spreads and provide more shares and available price levels for the market. Indeed, this is why many exchanges actually give *rebates* for orders that lie in the books but are eventually executed — they are providing liquidity — whereas fees are routinely charged for aggressive orders, which are removing liquidity. Furthermore, if one of the advantages of (and concerns over) HFT is the ability to very rapidly take and liquidate positions to profit from short-term informational advantages, aggressive order placement is necessary: if we have a predictive advantage for (say) 1 second, we can’t realize it by waiting for the other side of the market to come to us — we must initiate the entry and exit trades.

For these reasons, in the current study we shall restrict our attention to aggressive order placement. A concrete example of a type of HFT we are excluding by this choice is market-making, in which a trader tries to perpetually maintain both buy and sell passive limit orders, profiting whenever pairs of such orders are executed without ever acquiring significant (long or short) inventory. While market-making is a natural and common type of trading strategy, we again note that it is *not* generally cited as part of the concern over HFT.

## 4.2 Short Holding Periods

As discussed in the introduction, the part of the definition of HFT that most parties seem to be able to agree on is the ability to place (and therefore execute or cancel) orders on an extremely short time scale. However, if such an ability is used to instigate positions that are then *held* for hours or even many seconds, the advantage of HFT is already lost, since nowadays even the slowest electronic access to the exchanges would typically be measured in hundreds of milliseconds. In other words, either (much of) the profitability of a given trade is realized almost immediately after it is executed, in which case only a fast trader can capture the value, or the profitability is realized over a longer horizon, in which case almost any competent electronic trading platform can capture it. Also, holding positions for longer periods of time is associated with higher risk, whereas HFT is often portrayed as a lower risk, technology-fueled activity that hinges on fast access to the marketplace to take advantage of fleeting opportunities.

We thus posit that with regards to the debate surrounding HFT, *only trades held for short periods should be considered*. In our study we shall consider holding periods as short as 10 milliseconds and as long as 10 seconds; in our view the latter already stretches the definition of HFT, but we include it to err on the side of generality.

## 5 Methodology and Data

At the core of our empirical approach is the *Omniscient Trader Methodology* (OTM). While there are technical details to be discussed shortly, the underlying idea behind the OTM is quite simple: given complete historical data on a given stock, we can identify exactly those trades that *would* have been profitable *in hindsight* — that is, given complete knowledge of the trading future of the stock in question. We thus simulate an Omniscient Trader (OT), whose profitability is obviously an upper bound on the profitability of *any* realistic strategy that must make on-line trading decisions based only on the past, and not future data.

Of course, to be meaningful and interesting the OTM must be applied to some reasonably restricted class of trades, otherwise trades such as “buy all available shares of Google at its IPO and hold them until the present” will produce wild profitability but little insight. Since our primary interest is in HFT, as discussed above the main constraints we shall place on the OT are those of short holding periods and aggressive trade execution.

We shall apply the OTM to two different sources of raw trading data. The first source consists of complete event information (order placements, cancellations, modifications, and trade executions) for a set of 19 highly liquid NASDAQ stocks; this data is sufficient to fully reconstruct the complete historical order books for each stock at any moment in 2008. (The data is limited to 19 stocks because of the computational intensity of the resulting experiments, discussed below.) We shall refer to this data set as the *order book* data. The second data source (known in finance as Trade and Quote, or TAQ, data) consists of a somewhat cruder summary of liquidity, but for a much larger set of stocks and exchanges. Both of our data sets are commercially available and widely used in quantitative finance.



Our overall methodology is to first apply the OTM to the order book data, which provides us with a very detailed view of profitability and the relationships between a number of fundamental microstructure variables for the limited set of 19 stocks on NASDAQ. We then use contemporaneous TAQ data and regression methods on the same 19 stocks in order to construct reliable models for scaling up our estimates to the full universe of U.S. equities and exchanges (including NYSE). Here we will first describe the OTM as applied to the order book data; in Section 7 we describe the use of TAQ data for the broader universe.

We have implemented a rather powerful and flexible software platform that fully reconstructs the historical order books for a given NASDAQ stock at any chosen time resolution, and can simulate (or “backtest” in the parlance of finance) a wide variety of quantitative trading strategies. In this framework, we simulate the profitability of the following OT, whose only parameter is the *holding period*  $h$ :

- At each time  $t$ , the OT may either buy or sell  $v$  shares, for every integer  $v \geq 0$ . The purchase or sale of the  $v$  shares occurs at market prices; thus according to the standard U.S. equities limit order mechanism, the OT crosses the spread and consumes the first  $v$  shares on the opposing order book, receiving possibly progressively worse prices for successive shares.
- If at time  $t$  the OT bought/sold  $v$  shares, at time  $t + h$  it must liquidate this position and sell/buy the shares back, again by crossing the spread and paying market prices on the opposing book. (In Section 8 we discuss the effects of allowing a variable holding period.)
- At each time  $t$ , the OT makes only that trade (buying or selling, and the choice of  $v$ ) that *optimizes profitability*. Obviously it is this aspect of the OT that requires knowledge of the future. Note that if no trade at  $t$  has positive profitability, the OT does nothing.

This design for the OT accurately captures the fundamental tension of (aggressive) HFT. If we denote the bid-ask spread at time  $t$  by  $s_t$ , it is clear that the purchase or sale of even a single share by the OT will incur transaction costs on the order of at least  $\frac{1}{2}(s_t + s_{t+h})$  — the mean of the spreads at the onset and liquidation of the position. Larger values for  $v$  will increase these costs, since eating further into the opposing books effectively widens the spreads. Thus, in order for a trade of  $v$  shares to be profitable, the share price *must have time to change enough to cover the spread-based transaction costs*. (Since we omnisciently optimize between buying and selling, as well as the trade volume, sufficient movement either up or down will result in some profitable trade.) Of course, the smaller the holding period  $h$ , the less frequently such fluctuations will occur — indeed, we find that for sufficiently small  $h$ , the vast majority of the time the optimal choice is  $v = 0$  — that is, no trade is made by the OT.

We assert that this tension between the depth of liquidity (as represented by the spreads and volumes available at different prices in the order books) and holding periods sufficiently long to permit profitable price movement is the fundamental source of limitation of aggressive HFT profitability. One of our primary contributions is to carefully measure this tension experimentally, and show that the limitations are indeed severe at short holding periods (i.e., true HFT).

We now briefly remark on a number of further details on our data and experimental methodology.

- The order book data provides, for every NASDAQ stock, every single message sent to and from the exchange in 2008 — order placements, modification, cancellations, and executions — with high-resolution (sub-millisecond) timestamps. This data is voluminous: for a liquid stock such as AAPL, the data for just a single day averages 138 MB, and for efficiency it must be decompressed and recompressed online rather than in batch.
- The data volume and computational intensity of our experiments preclude examining the entire NASDAQ universe (and as we shall see, this is wholly unnecessary for our purposes since we employ methods for estimating profits on a much broader universe). We thus selected a set of 19 stocks on which to conduct our initial experiments. These stocks were sampled from among the most liquid NASDAQ stocks, since as we shall see liquidity is highly correlated with profitability of HFT.<sup>5</sup> Even restricted to these 19 stocks, a run of our OTM experiments for just a single holding period consumes many CPU-days.

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<sup>5</sup>The ticker symbols of the specific stocks examined are AAPL, ADBE, AMGN, AMZN, BIIB, CELG, COST, CSCO, DELL, EBAY, ESRX, GILD, GOOG, INTC, MSFT, ORCL, QCOM, SCHW, and YHOO.

- In our OTM simulations, the books are used to compute the most profitable trade at each moment, but immediately “reset” to their previous state following any action by the OT. In other words, we assume the trades of the OT have *no impact* on the market (not even reducing the liquidity available to the OT in the future), since we cannot realistically propagate such effects from historical data. Thus we err strongly on the side of overestimating profitability; in real markets trades nearly always have negative price impacts for the trader.
- We discretize time into distinct instances at which the HFT is able to consider placing a profitable trade under the OTM, since otherwise, having no lasting effect on the market, the OT could make the same profitable trade an arbitrary number of times in rapid succession. At the extreme, we might allow new trades to be placed any time the books change, but this leads to massive overcounting — for instance, a cancellation of an order deep in the books does not really provide a “new” trading opportunity from a picosecond before the cancellation. Thus, for the results reported here, we chose to allow trading every 10 milliseconds conditioned on there being *any* change — in prices, volumes, numbers of orders, etc. — at the bid or ask prices. Again, it is nearly certain that we are overcounting profitability (i.e., counting what is essentially the same profitable trade many times) due to small, inconsequential changes to the books<sup>6</sup>. In any case, we conducted the same experiments using a variety of other choices, including the logical extreme of every exchange event, and the findings were qualitatively the same.
- HFT was widespread during 2008, and the order book data we use already reflects that HF activity. Thus there might be concern that we are only measuring the *additional* profits not already extracted by real HFT during that year. This is not true, however, since the OTM captures *all* profitable trades, including those that were realized by actual HF traders in 2008. This is because the OT is infinitely fast and can immediately capitalize on every opportunity, regardless of whether a real trader did the same moments later. More precisely, if there was a profitable trade actually realized by a HFT party and thus reflected in our data, the OTM will capture this same trade by making it an instant earlier in our simulation.

In short, using the OTM we err on the side of optimism and overestimation of HFT profitability in as many dimensions as possible: complete knowledge of the future, computation of the optimally profitable volume to trade, rapid instance generation leading to overcounting of profitable trades, exclusion of exchange fees and commissions, and so on. Still, we shall see that powerful insights and limitations can be gleaned from our results. Of course, there are also limitations to our approach, which we discuss in Section 8.

## 6 Omniscient Order Book Trading

Our first set of results is presented in the six panels of Figure 2. In each panel, the x-axis measures the holding period, sampled at values of 0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 seconds. The y-axes measure a variety of different quantities against these holding periods.

Panel (A) of Figure 2 presents what is perhaps our simplest and most fundamental finding. For each of the holding periods, it plots the total 2008 OT profits (in dollars) for the 19 stocks in our order book data set. Because of the nature of the OT, we can interpret these values as the *maximum possible total profitability for aggressive HFT in these stocks in all of 2008*. The most striking aspects of this plot are the absolute numbers themselves: even at the longest holding period of 10 seconds (which again stretches even the most liberal interpretation of “high frequency”) the total 2008 OT profits are only \$3.4 billion — a figure any individual person or trading group would be happy to reap, but perhaps small considering the omniscience assumption and high liquidity of these stocks. Furthermore, profitability at shorter holding periods falls off rapidly, down to just \$62,000 for the shortest (10ms) holding period. We conclude that the combination of aggressive order placement with short holding periods *severely* limits the potential profitability of HFT in these 19 stocks; we shall see shortly that this story remains essentially unchanged when we scale up to a much larger universe of stocks and exchanges.

<sup>6</sup>The main reason that we do not systematically address this overcounting — e.g. by removing orders against which we have already executed — is that the methodology described preserves the original price formation dynamics. Otherwise, we would have to impose some model of order book evolution following our hypothetical trades.




Figure 2: OT profits and other quantities vs. holding period for the 19 NASDAQ stocks on the order book data.

Panel (A) establishes that OT profitability decays strongly with shorter holding periods, but does not quantify the cause of this decay; for instance, it could be that there are fewer profitable trades present at shorter holding periods, or that the trades present at shorter holding are less profitable on average, or have lower returns. In panels (B) through (F) of Figure 2 we examine these and other quantities as a function of holding period in our experiments.

Panels (B) and (C) examine two measures of total OT trading volume — the total number of profitable trades executed, and the total number of shares traded in those profitable trades. We see that these plots show a decay at short holding periods similar to that for total profitability. For instance, the ratio of total profitability at 1 second holding to that at 10 second holding is 0.036; the analogous figures for number of trades and total number of shares are 0.13 and 0.039. So profitability is falling roughly in tandem with the number of trading opportunities and (especially) the total share volume.

Panel (D) plots the average number of shares per trade against holding period. Remembering that the OTM explicitly optimizes the number of shares to maximize the total profitability of each trade, we can view this plot as measuring the depth of the opposing book that can be profitably consumed at each holding period. As expected, this decays with shorter holding periods — the trading costs of eating deep into the opposing books are not overcome by favorable price movement at shorter horizons — but we see strong sublinearity to this plot, with the ratio of shares per trade at 1 second to 10 seconds being 0.63 — qualitatively larger than for the measures above. Only at the very shortest holding periods do we see a precipitous decline in the optimal trade volume.<sup>7</sup> A similar picture holds for the average dollar profit per trade (panel (E)) and average returns (panel (F)) — they are relatively steady in the 1 to 10 second range, but fall quickly at the shortest (sub-second) holding periods.

In short, everything gets worse for the OT at short holding periods: profits plummet, and the first-order explanation for this is simply that there are many fewer profitable trading opportunities as a result of the

<sup>7</sup>We note that the fact that several thousand shares per trade are executed at the longest holding period also suggests that our profit overestimation is likely greatest there, since such large trades would almost certainly have significant negative longer-term price impacts.



trade-off between horizon and execution costs. In addition, when profitable trades are present, they are of smaller volume and lower returns.




Figure 3: OT profits and returns by stock on the order book data.

The plots of Figure 2 aggregate quantities across all 19 of the stocks in our order book data set; however, also of interest is how these quantities are distributed across the individual stocks. For simplicity we focus on just the longest (and most profitable) holding period of 10 seconds, but the story remains qualitatively similar at shorter holding.

The bar charts of Figure 3 show total 2008 OT profits (panel (A)), average profit per trade (panel (B)), and average return (panel (C)) on a stock-by-stock basis, with each bar labeled by the relevant ticker symbol for the stock in question. The stocks are sorted in each plot by their total profitability.

Perhaps most striking is the rapid decline in profitability as we move to less profitable stocks (panel (A)). Indeed, just 5 of the 19 stocks — AAPL, MSFT, CSCO, INTC and YHOO — already account for 73% of the total profits, while the worst 10 account for only 13%. Thus, not only is aggressive HFT surprisingly modest in profitability, that profitability is also highly concentrated in just a handful of the most liquid stocks. (Recall that high liquidity was a primary rationale for our choice of these 19 stocks in the first place, and we shall see shortly that liquidity is highly correlated with profitability.)

Panels (B) and (C) of Figure 3 demonstrate that while the average profit per trade is again rather concentrated among a handful of the most liquid stocks, returns remain relatively constant across stocks. OT profitability is primarily driven by liquidity, and there are a handful of stocks that are outliers in this regard, providing much greater usable depth of book to the OT. Returns, however — which do not reward the higher absolute profits that come with greater trade volume — are driven by price volatility, and there are no stocks here with volatility orders of magnitude greater than the average.

We conclude our experimental OT order book data results with a brief temporal study, presented in Figure 4, which shows the total 19-stock OT profits in 2008 on a monthly basis for holding periods of 10, 5, and 1 seconds. Of particular note is the spike in profitability in October 2008, which corresponds to the peak of the financial crisis, shortly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the chain of events it set in motion. The fact that certain HFT groups enjoyed great profitability during the crisis, as many banks and

hedge funds were forced to liquidate assets, is well-known and indeed part of the controversy surrounding HFT. Interestingly, this spike diminishes as one moves to shorter holding periods — the ratio of October to average monthly profits decreases monotonically from 2.13 at 10 seconds holding to 1.64 at 10 ms holding (not plotted). Again, we have a horizon/cost trade-off at work here, as it is also well-known that spreads widened considerably during the crisis, making it harder to “victimize” liquidating parties at the shortest time scales under aggressive execution methods.




Figure 4: Profits by month and holding period

## 7 Market-Wide Extrapolation

The results described so far suffer from two primary limitations: they consider only a set of 19 NASDAQ-listed stocks (albeit highly liquid ones); and they consider only trading activity within the actual NASDAQ exchange (the so-called “primary” exchange for these stocks), whereas trading occurs in a broader set of venues (“composite” activity). In this section we address these limitations and extrapolate our results to all stocks and all exchanges by utilizing a broader but somewhat less detailed data source known as Trade and Quote (TAQ). These extrapolations lead to our final estimated upper bound on the profits available to HFT in 2008 on the entirety of the US stock market. First, we estimate a primary-to-composite conversion ratio (in a given name, around 50% of profits come from the primary exchange); then we propose a simple model that relates HFT profitability to the number of quote updates in a given stock, and use it to get market-wide results.

### 7.1 Exchanges and TAQ

Our full order book data are collected solely from the NASDAQ exchange; however, in reality the 19 stocks, though traded primarily on NASDAQ, are also traded on a variety of alternative exchanges that in some instances may offer better pricing. In order to account for the additional profits available to traders operating across multiple exchanges, we rely on the fact that commercially available TAQ data are sufficient to reconstruct the bid and ask prices, as well as the total number of shares available at those prices, at any past moment, both on the primary exchange (NASDAQ for our 19 stocks) as well as a composite of all US exchanges. By comparing the two scenarios, we can estimate the additional profits available on secondary exchanges.

Unfortunately, TAQ data are limited in that they do not record liquidity offered beyond the current bid and ask prices. As a result, we cannot fully simulate our omniscient trader, which utilizes the full depth of the books. We therefore proceed by first establishing an empirical correspondence between the OT discussed so far and a modified OT that we can simulate using TAQ data alone. We then use the modified OT to extrapolate our results.




Figure 5: Modified vs original OT profit estimates




Figure 6: Composite vs. primary exchange profits

Recall that our OT to this point has been allowed to trade any number of shares at each time  $t$  and must liquidate the position at time  $t + h$ , where  $h$  is the holding period. Since TAQ data do not allow us to compute the profitability of trades that reach beyond the top of the book, we modify the OT as follows. At each time  $t$ , the OT can buy or sell  $v$  shares, where  $v \geq 0$  is an integer bounded by the number of shares available to buy (sell) at the ask (bid) at time  $t$  as well as the number of shares available to sell (buy) at the bid (ask) at time  $t + h$ . For example, if 100 shares are offered at the ask price at time  $t$  and 50 shares are offered at the bid price at time  $t + h$ , then the OT can only consider buying up to 50 shares at time  $t$ . (Since the trader is omniscient, it can compute these limits even though they depend on future information.) As before, any position taken at time  $t$  must be liquidated at time  $t + h$ .

We began by computing the theoretical profits of the modified OT from TAQ data using primary (NASDAQ-only) pricing, closely replicating the setting from Section 6. Figure 5 compares these profits with those of the original OT for the 19 stocks across all of 2008. The holding period for both traders is 10 seconds, though the results do not differ significantly at shorter holding periods. Note that due to small differences between the two data sources, the modified OT (simulated on TAQ data) occasionally achieves higher profits than the original OT (simulated on full order book data). Nonetheless, the correlation coefficient between the two traders' profits is 0.969. Because of this close linear relationship, we proceed under the assumption that the original OT's profits are closely estimated as a multiple of the modified OT's profits. This allows us to directly apply extrapolation ratios computed using TAQ data to the profits reported in Section 6.

We next used TAQ data to compute the profitability of the modified OT given the more inclusive composite pricing. Because spreads can only shrink as additional exchanges are allowed to compete, we expect to see greater profits from aggressive HFT in this setting. Figure 6 shows the ratio of the modified OT's profits under composite pricing to those under primary pricing for each of the 19 stocks at the most profitable holding period of 10 seconds. On average, profits increase by a factor of 2.1; this ratio is nearly the same across stocks, suggesting that the inclusion of secondary exchanges has a consistent, measurable effect on potential HFT profits.




Figure 7: Composite profit upper bounds (10 second holding) vs number of quotes

Finally, we estimated composite profits of the original OT by multiplying the profits reported in Section 6 by the corresponding ratios depicted in Figure 6.<sup>8</sup> The results, shown in Table 1, are estimated upper bounds on the total profits available to the OT with 10 second holding and access to all US exchanges for all of 2008.

AAPL	\$1,490 M	ESRX	\$14 M
ADBE	\$71 M	GILD	\$84 M
AMGN	\$73 M	GOOG	\$257 M
AMZN	\$112 M	INTC	\$913 M
BIIB	\$19 M	MSFT	\$1,424 M
CELG	\$26 M	ORCL	\$409 M
COST	\$48 M	QCOM	\$346 M
CSCO	\$924 M	SCHW	\$114 M
DELL	\$257 M	YHOO	\$518 M
EBAY	\$170 M		

Table 1: Composite profit upper bounds for the original OT at 10 second holding, in millions

## 7.2 Regression

Having estimated bounds on the maximum profits available from high-frequency trading for 19 high-volume NASDAQ stocks, we proceed to extrapolate these figures to a wider universe of stocks. While we could use TAQ data to simulate the modified OT for many stocks, the costs of simulation make it impractical to do so. We therefore turn to a simple regression approach, estimating potential profits as a function of high-level information extracted from the TAQ data. One could imagine using a large and diverse array of statistics as the basis for a very accurate profit model; however, complex approaches run the risk of overfitting and may not generalize well to other stocks. Instead, we found that a single simple measurement is sufficient to closely predict the simulated profits. Specifically, for each stock we compute the number of times during 2008 that the best available offer changed, either in price or quantity, on the stock’s primary exchange. This value is simply the total number of quotes reported in the TAQ data.

Figure 7 shows the fit between profits and the number of TAQ quotes achieved by a simple two-parameter power law model for the same 19 stocks. The  $R^2$  value is 0.968. Using this regression, we can quickly estimate potential profits for a full universe of 6,279 US stocks, yielding a bound on the total HFT profits available in all of 2008 at 10 second holding: \$21.3 billion. Figure 8 shows a histogram of our profit bounds across these stocks. Note that in these analyses we have included only equities, which are the primary domain of retail

<sup>8</sup>We also apply a small correction term to account for several days in 2008 where our order book data is incomplete for technical reasons. This increases our final results by less than 5%.




Figure 8: Histogram of profit bounds for US stocks (10 second holding)




Figure 9: Upper bound on profits for all US stocks vs holding period

traders, and not other exchange-traded instruments like futures or ETFs. Inclusion of these would increase our profitability estimates but not significantly alter our conclusions.

Finally, applying the same primary-to-composite and regression methodologies to each holding period yields the curve shown in Figure 9. As discussed at the outset, profits fall off sharply from a high of \$21 billion at 10-second holding to just \$21 million at 10 milliseconds. While these bounds are only estimates — the extrapolation process is necessarily imperfect — they give a rough picture of the profits we might expect from our OT, which are themselves likely to be large overestimates of the profits that could be realized in practice.

## 8 Perspective

We conclude by offering some perspective on the size of the profit bounds in Sections 6 and 7. The total annual trading volume in the US stock market (measured from TAQ data) is approximately \$52 trillion, thus the maximum theoretical profit reaped by aggressive HF traders on the US market — i.e., the largest number reported in this work — is less than 0.05% of trading volume.

Furthermore, it is important to reiterate that we vastly overestimate, in a number of ways, the profits that could actually be achieved by a real-world trader:

- We assume no trading fees or commissions are paid by the HFT.
- We assume the trader is omniscient and can exactly predict future price movements.

- We assume the trader knows not only whether to buy or sell, but also precisely the optimal number of shares to trade at every moment.
- We assume that these perfect predictions are made infinitely fast, and that trades execute with zero latency.
- We assume that the trader's actions do not influence the market or create adverse price movement.
- We assume that orders taken by the trader remain on the books, allowing the trader to repeatedly profit from a single opportunity as often as 100 times per second.

All of these assumptions fail in practice, reducing realizable profit. For example, institutional traders might conservatively incur trading fees of about 0.6 cents per share. Since a large fraction of the price fluctuations within short holding periods are very small, these fees can be significant. In order to achieve the \$3.4 billion profits reported in Section 6, the OT would need to trade a total of 195 billion shares; if each such share cost 1.2 cents (since it must be transacted twice to realize a profit), the total trading fees would be \$2.3 billion, reducing profits by a full two thirds.

Furthermore, the job of predicting short term price fluctuations created by thousands of competing traders, each with a financial incentive to remove any predictability, presumably cannot be performed with anything like omniscient accuracy. We believe that recognizing even 10% of the profitable opportunities is a phenomenally difficult achievement in the real world. Assuming this bar was not surpassed, our results in Section 7 imply that 2008 HFT profits on the entire US stock market were bounded by \$2.1 billion. Of course, a real trader will not only fail to act on some profitable opportunities, but also mistakenly act in unprofitable cases, causing additional losses. This is especially true when considering trading fees that must be paid regardless of whether a trade is profitable.

There are a number of caveats and limitations to our findings as well:

- We consider only a discrete set of fixed holding periods. There may be additional profit opportunities that appear only at intermediate values of  $h$ . However, preliminary experiments in which the fixed holding period for each trade is replaced with the most profitable holding period (up to  $h$ ) for that trade result in only a modest increase in profits (less than 50%).
- We do not allow the OT to enter a position with a market order but exit with a limit order (or vice versa).
- While large trades typically create adverse price movement, we do not account for the possibility that a HF trader could profit by manipulating the market in the opposite way, for example, by generating excitement or panic. Of course, if this were so, there would be incentive for other HF traders to detect and revert such manipulations on a similarly short timescale.
- Finally, we again emphasize that our study is entirely limited to aggressive HFT, and does not address the potential profitability of passive, liquidity-providing HFT. Our justifications for this limitation have been detailed.

In the end, we believe that our results demonstrate a surprisingly low bound on the profitability of aggressive HFT. While undoubtedly a nontrivial source of income for some firms, profits from HFT, and consequently the costs to traders without the technological infrastructure necessary to compete, are relatively small.

We remark that 2008 was generally believed to be a banner year for HFT profitability due to the volatility of markets during the financial crisis. Our preliminary experiments on 2009 data suggest that 2009 HFT profits were indeed about half of our 2008 estimates, although this remains to be carefully verified.

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